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DOES COMMERCE CLAUSE REVIEW HAVE PERVERSE EFFECTS?
ADRIAN VERMEULE*
I.

INTRODUCTION

T

HERE is a crucial, although implicit, empirical assumption in the debate about federal judicial review under the affirmative Commerce
Clause. The assumption, indulged by many different camps in the debate,
is that Commerce Clause review decreases the centralization of policymaking by shifting policy authority to the states.' I want to suggest that, on
equally plausible empirical assumptions, Commerce Clause review will in
fact do just the opposite: it will promote the centralization of public policy
at the national level by providing congressional coalitions with ex ante incentives to legislate more broadly, and to create national programs that
are more comprehensive, than they would otherwise choose. So those
who favor Commerce Clause review because they favor decentralization
may have picked a course of action with perverse effects; they may have
picked the wrong team. And those who favor Commerce Clause review
because they believe the Constitution commands it should take into account that increased centralization may be a cost of their position.
II.

REACTIONARY CRITIQUES OF FEDERALISM REVIEW

Let me start with a brief typology of reactionary arguments against the
recent wave of judicially-enforced federalism. By "reactionary" I mean arguments that favor return to the immediate status quo ante 1995 (the date
of Lopez v. United STATES),2 or whenever we date the start of the current
period. Defenders of the United States Supreme Court's recent decisions
* Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. Prepared for "New Voices on
the New Federalism," Villanova Law School, October 28, 2000. Thanks to Jack
Goldsmith, Daryl Levinson, Eric Posner, David Strauss, Cass Sunstein and the
Symposium participants for helpful comments, and to the editors of the Villanova
Law Review for helpful editing. Stephanie Morris and Jamil Jaffer provided
excellent research assistance.
1. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Crime Control and the Commerce Clause: Life After Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 801, 842-43 (1996) (explaining impact of Commerce
Clause review under Lopez on congressional action to federalize state or local
crimes); Robert F. Nagel, The Future of Federalism,46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643, 65558 (1996) (noting one assumption underlying United States v. Lopez is that Court
favors "significant decentralization"). In Brickey's view, Lopez counters the congressional trend towards federalizing traditionally state-controlled acts by serving
as a "reminder that, contrary to contemporary thought, congressional power
under the Commerce Clause is not unlimited, that states have primary authority to
define and enforce criminal laws, and that much of what Congress has enacted
needlessly alters the balance between federal and state jurisdiction." Brickey,
supra, at 843-44.
2. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).

(1325)
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are sometimes called reactionary, because some of them claim to favor a
return to some pre-1937 state of affairs. 3 That claim, however, is just the
standard rhetoric of revolutionaries, who attribute all good things to some
imagined past era of virtuous government. That is why Justice Souter, the
most consistently Burkean member of the current Court, condemns the
revival ofjudicially-enforced federalism as a disruption of a workable status
quo.

4

Albert Hirschman classifies reactionary rhetoric into jeopardy arguments, futility arguments and perversity arguments. 5 Jeopardy arguments
object to a proposal on the ground that it jeopardizes some other value
the proponent holds dear. In the federalism context, the jeopardy arguments are weak. It has been said that judicial review of federal statutes in
the name of federalism is undemocratic, except that here the countermajoritarian difficulty doesn't seem terribly troubling. Federalism review
doesn't place any policy domain off limits to democratic majorities; it real-

locates policymaking authority between national and local majorities.
Other jeopardy arguments might point out that judicially-enforced federalism jeopardizes gun control, or protection of endangered species, or
some other substantive value. But the best jeopardy arguments point to
shared values whose protection is appealing to all participants in the debate, whereas these substantive ends are, in some circles, as contentious as
federalism itself.
A futility argument claims that the proposal at issue will be useless or
inconsequential; it will not accomplish the goal it seeks. Here, the most
common futility argument is the claim, advanced insistently byJustice Souter, that Commerce Clause review will prove fruitless because the doctrinal
categories the Court uses or can use are too permeable and unstable. 6 But
it's hard to see why that is any more true for the Commerce Clause than
for due process of law. 7 A more sophisticated claim is that the recent
Commerce Clause decisions just don't matter very much, 8 although one
3. See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Delegation Running Riot, 1995 No. 1 REG. 83, 83-84
(1995) (book review) (noting that some scholars "labor on in the hope of a restoration" of "ancient exiles," such as Commerce Clause, to their status of sixty years
ago).
4. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 611 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that previous
Court decisions "overriding congressional policy choices under the Commerce
Clause" were flawed and "[t] here is no reason to expect the lesson would be different another time"). See generally Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean
Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619, 654-56, 717
(1994) (arguing that Justice Souter's jurisprudential commitments are Burkean).
5. See generally ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERsrY, FUTILITY, JEOPARDY (1991).

6. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 628-29 (Souter, J., dissenting).
7. See Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double.Standard of
Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75 (2001).
8. See Nagel, supra note 1, at 829 (stating that "instincts and beliefs of most of
the Justices [on Lopez] are unlikely to result in any important changes in the scope
of national regulatory power").
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hears much less of that view since the warning shot across Congress' bow
in Lopez has been followed by the full-out broadside of United States v. Morrison.9 It might also be said that the commerce cases are not as consequential as the other federalism cases about commandeering, state
sovereign immunity and so on. But that claim specifies no metric for making the comparative judgment of consequentiality. Striking down any federal statute is consequential in one sense, but on a broader view the whole
institution of judicial review may be unimportant, in that the presence or
absence of judicial review apparently makes little difference to the freedom, prosperity or welfare of an economically-developed polity.10
A perversity argument is less dismal than a futility argument. It claims
not that the proposal will be useless, but that it will be affirmatively
counterproductive, producing results in the opposite direction from the
one intended. The best-known perversity argument against federalism review is Justice Stevens' claim that an anti-commandeering rule will simply
produce more outright federal preemption of state law. 1 Stevens' point
is that for states-righters this is perverse, because the creation of new federal bureaucracies to enforce preemptive statutes may displace more state
activity than does commandeering. But sheer quantity of intrusion is not
the central objection to commandeering. Instead the objection, for
whatever it may be worth, is that commandeering inflicts an expressive or
dignitary offense to state sovereignty.' 2 So Stevens' argument can only be
reconstructed, if at all, as a jeopardy point: an anti-commandeering rule
will produce greater policy centralization through federal preemption,
and that centralization is objectionable on other grounds.
There are analogous arguments in the cases concerning state sover-'
eign immunity from private damages suits in federal courts 13 or in state
courts.

14

Perhaps forbidding private damages suits against states will

merely increase the number of suits against states brought by the United
9. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Morrison held, inter alia, that Congress lacked Com-

merce Clause authority to enact the Violence Against Women Act. See id. at 602.
10. See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 189-91 (1989) (noting
that liberal democracies without full judicial review are not systematically less democratic or prosperous than United States).
11. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 959 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
12. See Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism:
New York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 Sup. CT. REv. 71, 92-95 (examining claim that
commandeering "infringes upon the state's functioning as a political community

in a distinctive and emphatic way"). Adler and Kreimer convincingly dispose of

the idea, central to New York v. United States but downplayed in Printz, that the
critical objection to commandeering is that it undermines the accountability of
federal lawmakers. See id. at 99-101.
13. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 did not validly abrogate states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity).
14. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding Congress may
not subject non-consenting states to private suits for damages in state courts).
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States, which are not barred, or suits by private parties for injunctive relief
against state officials. In the latter case, the bar on damages suits will itself
contribute to the necessary showing of irreparable injury. 15 Here too,
however, the seeming perversity argument is really best understood as a
jeopardy argument, because the harm that flows from the new form of
federalism review is not truly a perverse harm. It does not damage the very
interest the Court is attempting to protect; it damages a different interest.
Rightly or wrongly, much Eleventh Amendment/immunity doctrine seems
to assume that states suffer a special dignitary offense in private damages
suits that they do not suffer in other types of suits. Rules that encourage
substitution from one type to the other are not perverse, although they
may be misguided in other respects.

There is a true perversity argument relevant to the federalism cases,
but it applies only to the Commerce Clause. I will advance that argument
here.
III.

THE POTENTIALLY PERVERSE EFFECTS OF COMMERCE CLAUSE REVIEW

A.

The Theoretical Problem

For ease of exposition, I shall stipulate that those who support Commerce Clause review do so because: (1) they support policy decentralization; and (2) they assume that Commerce Clause review will promote that
goal. 16 This is a soft rational-choice assumption that allows maximizing
actors to hold preferences over institutional arrangements, as well as over
substantive policies. 17 A different view would hold that the Justices who
support Commerce Clause review do so because they believe the Constitution requires it. But I need not contest that possibility, because all the
15. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Irony of Immunity: The Eleventh Amendment, Irreparable Injury, and Section 1983, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1311, 1314-17 (2001).
16. These are descriptive premises. I mean to take no position on the claim
that the normative arguments for federalism are merely arguments for administrative decentralization. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some
Notes on a NationalNeurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 914-26 (1994).
17. But see Frank B. Cross, Realism About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1305,
1307-13 (1999). Cross' view seems to be that nobody cares about which level of
government makes what decision; instead people care only about substantive outcomes, and all federalism rhetoric is opportunistic. See id. at 1307 (arguing that
"federalism is consistently.., employed only derivatively, as a tool to achieve some
other ideological end, rather than as a principled end in and of itself'). But that
claim faces too many counter-examples. Any view that requires attributing to
Chief Justice Rehnquist a substantive preference for allowing guns to be carried
near schools never gets off the ground. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995) (invalidating Gun-Free Schools Zone Act of 1990). To be sure, the
proponent of decentralization may hope that it will promote some more remote
substantive end. The libertarian defender of property rights, for example, may
hope that inter-jurisdictional competition will protect property from redistributive
legislation. See Richard A. Epstein, The ProperScope of Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV.

1387, 1454 (1987).

But the proximate preference is still institutional, not

substantive.
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points I want to make hold whether or not it is true. Even Justices who
vote their best constitutional understanding of the Commerce Clause
would want to know, or should want to know, the costs and benefits of
doing so-in part because most (plausible) interpretive theories hold that
the consequences of alternative interpretations are themselves relevant to
the determination of meaning,1 8 even if consequences are not dispositive,
and also because the role morality of the judge does not license blindness
to the consequences of action. So it matters, even on this view of what the
Justices maximize, whether the recent resurgence of Commerce Clause
review promotes centralization or localism.
The more interesting question is whether the revival of Commerce
Clause review will indeed promote decentralization. The standard assumption is that it will, and that view has intuitive appeal. Suppose that at
some given time, courts are engaging in no Commerce Clause reviewroughly the situation before Lopez. 19 After that time, as the courts move
incrementally from no Commerce Clause review to moderate Commerce
Clause review-striking down a couple of statutes, as in Lopez and Morrison-judges may assume that centralization decreases linearly. After all,
the courts are striking down federal statutes on the ground that the statute
exceeds the federal government's constitutional authority, even though
the states may enact precisely the same rule, absent some other constitutional prohibition. There is also another decentralizing effect: not only
are judges wiping out national regulatory statutes, but legislative coalitions
may sometimes take account of the new constitutional restrictions by filtering out proposed bills that would violate them (if the risk ofjudicial invalidation makes Congress less likely, rather than more likely, to enact
unconstitutional laws-admittedly a murky question).
But the assumption that an incremental increase in Commerce
Clause review produces a linear decrease in centralization may get things
backwards. Instead, a move from no Commerce Clause review to some
Commerce Clause review may produce an increase in centralization. To be
sure, a further move to even more intensive review-a move from the position of the Lopez majority opinion to say, Justice Thomas' concurring position 2 0-might begin to effect real decentralization. But that is just to say
that centralization, as a function of increasingly stringent Commerce
Clause review, might not be continuously decreasing, but rather might display an inverted U-shape.

18. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 299-302 (1990)
(discussing consequentialism in statutory interpretation).
19. See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,
276-80 (1981) (applying rational basis test, which requires court to defer to congressional findings that regulated activity affects interstate commerce); Perez v.
United States, 402 U.S. 146, 155-56 (1971) (same); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294, 299-301 (1964) (same); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241, 252-53 (1964) (same).
20. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 597-602 (Thomas, J., concurring) (advocating judicial enforcement of distinction between "commerce" and "manufacturing").
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This inverted U-shape arises if and when the doctrines the courts use
at the intermediate intensities of review allow Congress to enact otherwiseunconstitutional policies by broadening their scope or by bundling them
together with valid policies. The proponent of Commerce Clause review
assumes that if Congress enacts policy P and the courts strike it down, then
the decision has increased decentralization or, equivalently, prevented a
new centralization. But if the courts' rules allow or encourage Congress to
enact P so long as P is broadened to include some admittedly constitutional policy Q, or is bundled together with policy Q, then the result of
striking down P may not be to remit the decision about P to the states. It
may simply be to produce a federal statute that mandates both P and Q,
either because Congress reenacts the invalidated statute in its new, more
expansive form, or because Congress anticipates the effect of the judicial
rule and enacts the expansive form of the statute in the first instance.
Current doctrine under the Commerce Clause has just this effect of
encouraging the broadening and bundling of federal policies. Two doctrines are critical: the aggregation principle and the comprehensivescheme principle. Aggregation is familiar. The Court has said since Wickard v. Filburn2 ' that the substantial-effects test should be applied, not to
some particular instance of a regulated intrastate
activity, but to the class
of all such instances taken in the aggregate.2 2 Morrison added that aggregation has only been allowed (and presumably will only be allowed) for
intrastate activities that are themselves economic or commercial. 23 It is
clear that the aggregation principle "condition[s] the Commerce Clause
power to accomplish a certain goal on Congress legislating far more
broadly than necessary," as John Nagle puts it, because the effect of the
principle is that "if Congress gathers enough substantial impacts into the
24
covered class, the trivial impacts can be regulated, too."
The comprehensive-scheme principle has a similar consequence.
This principle holds that the regulation of some activity that Congress
could not reach standing alone, because the activity occurs intrastate and
lacks a substantial effect on commerce in its own right, may nonetheless be
constitutionally permissible if the regulation of that activity is essential or
integral to the maintenance of a larger regulatory regime governing interstate activity or commercial activity or both. This idea is at least as old as
21. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
22. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28; John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause
Meets the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV. 174, 193 (1998) (positing
that Wickard "has come to stand for" aggregation).
23. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 673 (2000) ("While we need
not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic
activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in our Nation's history our cases
have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature.").
24. Nagle, supra note 22, at 200-01.
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26
the Shreveport Rate Cases,2 5 but it takes center stage in Hodel v. Indiana,
which stated that challenged provisions not valid in themselves will be upheld if they are "an integral part of [a] regulatory program" that is valid
when taken as a whole. 27 And the idea surfaces in Lopez itself in a critical
passage that has gone largely unnoticed by commentators. The Gun-Free
School Zones Act, the Court said:

is not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity,
in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. It cannot, therefore, be sustained
under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out
of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed
28
in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.
The lower courts, however, did notice this passage, and they have frequently invoked the quoted passage from Lopez, both before and after Morrison.29 I'll give some examples below of cases that uphold statutes very
much like the statute struck down in Lopez, merely because those statutes
were packaged along with a larger national regulatory scheme. But here
I'll mention an important case decided after Morrison which shows that
bundling provisions can ensure the validity of all of them. The decision is
Gibbs v. Babbitt,30 in which the Fourth Circuit upheld federal regulations
that limited the killing of endangered red wolves on private land in North
Carolina.
Lopez and Morrison announced that the commerce power authorizes
congressional regulation of: (1) the channels of interstate commerce; (2)
instrumentalities, persons or things moving in interstate commerce; and
31
(3) intrastate activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.
Gibbs upheld the red wolf regulation on the ground that it fell within the
third Lopez/Morrison category. 32 The court invoked the aggregation principle to brush aside the objection that killing a single wolf doesn't affect
interstate commerce. 33 Killing all the red wolves would affect interstate
commerce by eliminating the red wolf tourism industry and in other
25. 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
26. 452 U.S. 314 (1981).
27. See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 329 n.17.
28. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
29. See, e.g.,
Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 491 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting the
passage after Morrison); United States v. Kirk, 105 F.3d 997, 1016 (5th Cir. 1997)
(quoting the passage before Moryison).
30. 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000).
31. See Morrison v. United States, 529 U.S. 598, 671 (2000) (quoting Lopez,
514 U.S. at 558-59).

32. See Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 491-99.
33. See id. at 493 ("While the taking of one red wolf on private land may not
be 'substantial,' the takings of red wolves in the aggregate have a sufficient impact
on interstate commerce to uphold this regulation.").

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2001

7

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 5 [2001], Art. 11
1332

VILIANovA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46: p. 1325

ways. 34 But Morrisonsays that only intrastate "commercial" or "economic"
activities can be aggregated, 35 and killing a red wolf doesn't look very
much like commercial or economic activity. The court said a killing might
have a commercial or economic motivation, if the farmer was trying to protect his livestock or homestead, 36 but so might carrying a gun around a

school, if the gun owner is selling drugs to young children and wants to
protect his sales territory against competitors.
Given the weakness of the aggregation argument, it is not surprising
that the court also invoked the comprehensive-scheme principle. 3 7 The
red wolf regulation, the court said, was "sustainable as 'an essential part of
a larger regulation of economic activity.' 38 The plaintiffs in Gibbs hadn't
challenged the facial validity of the Endangered Species Act under the
Commerce Clause, so the court could simply assume that the Act is indeed
a valid national regulatory scheme that bundled red wolf protection with
protections for many other endangered species in other states. The bundling appeared critical: "[G]iven that Congress has the ability to enact a
broad scheme for the conservation of endangered species," the court
wrote, "it is not for the courts to invalidate individual regulations."3 M This
can only mean that the red wolf regulation, even if unconstitutional standing alone, was constitutional because it was packaged with a broader set of
valid prohibitions.
This emphasizes one important difference between the comprehensive-scheme principle and the aggregation principle. The two are closely
related, because federal regulation of a class of activities that affects interstate commerce when taken in the aggregate will often be integral to the
success of a comprehensive national regulatory scheme. But the best reading of the cases suggests that the comprehensive-scheme principle, unlike
the aggregation principle, may allow Congress to regulate intrastate activities that are not themselves commercial or economic, so long as the regulation is integral to the success of a larger valid scheme of (interstate or
commercial) regulation. The key passage from Lopez, for example, suggests that the scheme taken as a whole must regulate economic activity,
while the ancillary regulation need not itself do so, at least if the ancillary
34. See id. at 492.

35. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 676. Justice Breyer's dissent reads the majority as
permitting two exceptions to this rule: (1) Congress may aggregate noneconomic
activity that takes place at economic establishments and (2) Congress may regulate
intrastate noneconomic activities where the regulation is an essential part of a
comprehensive national regulatory scheme. See id. at 700 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
For a further discussion of the second exception, see infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
36. See Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 492.
37. See id. at 497-99.
38. Id. at 497 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)).
39. Id. at 498.
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regulation "arises out of" or is "connected to" commercial activity.40 Judge
Edith Jones, who is occasionally unsympathetic to national regulation, understands the comprehensive-scheme principle in this way. 4 1 So does Justice Breyer: in an insightful passage in his Morrison dissent, he asked
whether the comprehensive-scheme principle would allow Congress to
"save the present law [the Violence Against Women Act] by including it,
42
or much of it, in a broader 'Safe Transport' or 'Workplace Safety' act?"
We don't know, of course, whether the Court will eventually confirm this
understanding, but certainly that's currently the law in the lower courts, as
I will discuss later.
B.

An Example

The aggregation and comprehensive-scheme principles allow and encourage Congress to ensure the constitutionality of otherwise-suspect provisions by broadening their scope, or by bundling them into a
comprehensive scheme of national economic regulation. The ex ante effect of the current rules, then, may just as easily promote broader federal
regulation-policy centralization-as retard it. A simple numerical example will illustrate the effect. Imagine that there are three legislators, A, B
and C. They are considering three proposals:
* Proposal 1 is a bill titled the "Gun-Free Nation Act." Section 1 of
the Act prohibits the transportation or use of handguns in interstate commerce and is clearly constitutional under current doctrine. Section 2 of the Act prohibits the bare possession of a
handgun, anywhere.
" Proposal 2 prohibits possession of a handgun within 1,000 feet of a
school. This is the "Gun-Free School Zones Act" invalidated in
43

Lopez.

Proposal 3 is that there be no federal handgun regulation (the status quo ante).
Our three legislators are assumed to have the following preference
ordering over these choices:
A (1>2>3)
B (3>2>1)
C (2>1>3)
(reading "Z(p>q>r)" to mean "legislator Z prefers proposal p to proposal q
and prefers proposal q to proposal r").
"

40. For the text of the passage from Lopez, see supra text accompanying note
28.
41. See United States v. Kirk, 105 F.3d 997, 1013-14 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(]ones, J., dissenting) (distinguishing regulations of economic activity that substantially affect interstate commerce from regulations of simple "activity" essential to
maintaining larger regime of interstate economic regulation).
42. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 700 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1) (A) (1988 & Supp. V).
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The interesting legislator here is C. Legislators A and B are ideologues who both arrange the bills in order of their centralizing effects,
although they evaluate those effects from opposing normative premises.
C, however, has a complex preference structure: she is a moderate who
opposes comprehensive national gun regulation, but prefers that to no
national gun regulation at all. C has a puzzling worldview from the standpoint of someone who is ideologically committed either to seeing any incremental centralization as good (A) or any incremental centralization as
bad (B), because C's preferences aren't arranged in order of the bill's
centralizing tendency. Why might C have that preference structure? Well,
why not? Voting for a broad statute imposes political costs on C, in the
loss of political support from regulated parties, but voting to maintain the
non-regulation status quo would forfeit political support from those who
desire regulation. In C's case, these forces might net out as described.
Given the preferences of legislators A, B and C, imagine a series of
pairwise votes across the three proposals. In a vote between proposals I
and 2, 2 wins, while in a vote between proposals 2 and 3, 2 wins. Proposal
2, the Gun-Free School Zones Act, is enacted. 4 4 After Proposal 2 is enacted, a court strikes it down as exceeding congressional authority over
commerce. Proponents of localism dance in the streets. Subsequently,
however, there is another vote between Proposal 3 and Proposal 1. The
45
winner is Proposal 1-the Gun-Free Nation Act becomes law.
Is Section 2 of that law-the part that prohibits the bare possession of
a handgun, anywhere-constitutional? The courts of appeals think so.
Consider 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), which prohibits the simple "possession" of a
machinegun acquired after 1986.46 The section number should ring a
muffled bell. The statute struck down in Lopez was 18 U.S.C. § 9 22(q);
both provisions derive from the Firearms Owners' Protection Act of
1986.47 The eight circuits that have considered the constitutionality of the
44. Note that the order in which the pairwise votes were taken is completely
immaterial. Proposal 2 is a "Condorcet winner"-it defeats all other proposals in
pairwise competition. There is no voting cycle here and no aggregation problem.
The preferences of the individual legislators and the group-level preferences are
all perfectly well-behaved.
45. The analysis would be entirely different, of course, if we replace legislator
C with a legislator, D, who has the preferences (2>3>1). In that case the ultimate
winner would be Proposal 3, no federal regulation, rather than Proposal 1. But
that is not inconsistent with my claim, which is just that Commerce Clause review
can in principle have perverse effects, so long as legislators' preferences are arranged in the way illustrated in the text. Which arrangement of legislators' preferences actually obtains in any given case is an empirical question. For a further
discussion of the empirical issues, see infra section "C. The EmpiricalProblem."
46. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (1994). The statute actually prohibits both "possession" and "transfer," but in the cases I discuss, the latter prohibition was not at
issue.
47. See Firearms Owners' Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-308 (enacting
prohibitions against gun possession and usage).
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machinegun possession ban have all upheld it.48 The opinions commonly
distinguish Lopez on the ground that broader federal regulation is more
constitutionally defensible. The Third Circuit, for example, reasoned that
the Gun-Free School Zones Act attempted to regulate possession only
within school zones-"a discrete area unlikely to have a meaningful aggregate effect on commerce"-while the machinegun statute should be sustained because it is a general (albeit, intrastate) ban. 49 This is the
perverse effect of the aggregation principle: broaden the statute's reach
and there are more applications to aggregate, until the bar of the substantial-effects test has been cleared.
An objection to this analysis is that, after Morrison, only economic activities can be aggregated, and possession of a machinegun does not look
economic in any simple sense. So an even more popular rationale for
upholding § 922(o) has been the comprehensive-scheme principle. The
Second Circuit, following and summarizing precedent from all over the
nation, distinguished Lopez on the ground that the machinegun statute is
"integral to a larger federal scheme for the regulation of trafficking in
firearms." 50 The standard claim is that the federal regulatory scheme both
dampens supply, by prohibiting the trafficking and sale of firearms in interstate commerce, and also dampens demand, by criminalizing intrastate
possession. The demand-side regulation, then, is a necessary auxiliary to
the supply-side regulation, and the supply-side regulation is clearly valid as
an interstate regulation of commercial traffic. The flaw in the Gun-Free
School Zones Act, on this theory, is that it didn't ban enough intrastate
5
possession to squelch the demand-side of the firearms market. '
Both the aggregation theory and the comprehensive-scheme theory
support our hypothetical Gun-Free Nation Act. Section 1 is clearly constitutional. Section 2 can be upheld on the aggregation ground if we describe the prohibition as "economic," and by the Second Circuit's
reasoning it can certainly be upheld as an essential part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme. The ban on handgun possession is a necessary
auxiliary measure for dampening the demand-side of the market for illegal handguns, a market whose supply-side Congress has attacked by an
interstate regulation of unquestioned validity. By either expanding the
48. See United States v. Franklyn, 157 F.3d 90, 96 & n.3 (2d Cir. 1998) (upholding section 922(o) of Firearms Owners' Protection Act under Commerce
Clause); United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 1997) (same),
vacated on other grounds, 133 F.3d 1412 (1998); United States v. Knutson, 113 F.3d
27, 30-31 (5th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (same); United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d
273, 285 (3d Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Beuckelaere, 91 F.3d 781, 784-87
(6th Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Kenney, 91 F.3d 884, 891 (7th Cir. 1996)
(same); United States v. Rambo, 74 F.3d 948, 952 (9th Cir. 1995) (same); United
States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518, 1521-22 (10th Cir. 1995) (same).
49. Rybar, 103 F.3d at 282.
50. Franklyn, 157 F.3d at 94.
51. Thus the Gun-Free School Zones Act could not have been upheld on the
analysis discussed here.
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reach of the prohibition to aggregate more conduct, or by bundling the
intrastate prohibition with a comprehensive interstate regulatory scheme,
Congress can ensure the constitutionality of a provision that would be unconstitutional in its narrower, unbundled state. The upshot is that the
Gun-Free Nation Act will probably be upheld by the courts. The final result is an increase in centralization, relative not only to the no-regulation
baseline, but also to the law held unconstitutional on federalism grounds.
That result is perverse from the decentralizers' point of view.
Put another way, decentralizers like Justice Thomas have overlooked
that if you can't get your first choice, you're not necessarily better off the
closer you get to your first choice. From Thomas' point of view, the first
choice would be an extremely restrictive view of congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause. But he can't get that, so Thomas has joined
opinions like Lopez and Morrison, while issuing brief concurrences that tell
us he is merely voting for the rule closest to his own preferences within the
feasible set.5 2 But the effect of the Court's intermediate position may be
to move outcomes away from, not towards, Thomas' preferences, even relative to the pre-Lopez baseline. If Thomas' first-choice position derives
from a preference for localism, he should consider joining Justice Breyer
and the other dissenters.
From the point of view of moderately pro-federalism Justices like
O'Connor and Kennedy, the error is also perfectly natural. Here is one
plausible picture of the moderates' thinking. Starting from a baseline of
no Commerce Clause review at all, these Justices desire to increase the
intensity of review just a bit, eliminating a few statutes they see as largely
symbolic outliers, such as the Gun-Free School Zones Act and the Violence
Against Women Act,5 3 but without destabilizing politically entrenched legislation such as the New Deal entitlement statutes or the Endangered Species Act.54 So the natural position is to say that the outlier statutes don't
have a sufficient effect on commerce, or the right kind of effect, while
developing doctrinal exceptions that protect comprehensive federal programs. The problem is that, so long as the reigning legislative coalition
understands the rules and prefers some program to no program at all,
newly-enacted programs will tend to become more comprehensive.
In both cases the proponents of localism have overlooked that, once
the intermediate option is eliminated, there is no particular reason to assume a priorithat the second choice of federal legislators will be no federal
regulation, as opposed to far-reaching federal regulation. Precisely analogous perverse effects turn up in many areas of law in which courts or regu52. See generally United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 682 (2000) (Thomas,
J., concurring); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994) (enacted as part of Violence Against Women
Act); 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1) (A) (1988 & Supp. V) (enacted as part of Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990).
54. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1994).
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lators knock out an intermediate option without anticipating that the
regulated parties may then be driven to an extreme that is even less desirable. Consider Nollan v. CaliforniaCoastal Commission,55 in which the Court

held that localities couldn't condition a development permit on a nongermane concession, such as beachfront access. Some property-rights fans
expected that after Nollan local governments would start granting permits
without conditions. William Fischel has argued that, in fact, localities
might just refuse to grant permits at all, 56 and although the issues are
complicated, he is clearly right that that effect is empirically possible. For
another example, consider the claim-whether valid or not-that the
Court has erred by requiring states to provide equal welfare benefits to
long-time residents and to recent arrivals. 57 The states' reaction may not
be to level up by giving recent arrivals as much as established residents are
getting; the states may well level down by cutting benefits for both groups.
These are just two examples among many. The first example illustrates a general problem in unconstitutional conditions cases, where the
question is whether invalidating the condition will produce benefits without conditions or no benefits at all. The second illustrates a general problem in equal protection cases, where the question is whether barring a
discriminatory program will cause political actors to provide a nondiscriminatory program or to abolish the program altogether. In all of these
cases, whether the result can be described as "perverse" turns upon what
we are trying to achieve. From an egalitarian standpoint, for example, it
doesn't matter whether an inequality is cured by leveling down or leveling
up. But the important point is that the effect of knocking out intermediate options is unpredictable across contexts.
C.

The Empirical Problem

All I have demonstrated so far is that a perverse effect is possible;
there is absolutely no reason to assume a priorithat increasing the intensity
of Commerce Clause review, from a baseline of no review, causes a linear
decrease in centralization. It may well cause an increase in centralization,
as congressional coalitions that prefer a broad federal regulatory scheme
to no federal regulation at all broaden and bundle provisions to ensure
their constitutionality. That response would persist until the Court moved
to a far more intensive form of review a la Thomas. But the Court has no
stomach for that course of action; it is not politically feasible. As a result,
the principal consequence of the recent revival of Commerce Clause review may be to increase the centralization of national policymaking.
55. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
56. See William A. Fischel, Introduction: Utilitarian Balancing and Formalism in
Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1581, 1583 (1988) (suggesting prohibitions on conditions are barrier to land improvement).

57. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
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The next question is whether the possibility of perverse effects is empirically serious or not. There is no "burden of proof" on this question;
proponents of Commerce Clause review who assume a decentralizing effect have no foundation for their assumption, so we have to approach the
empirical question without presuppositions in either direction. Here I
shall first sketch some of the variables that an empirical analysis would
have to consider, and then I'll ask what courts should do about the Commerce Clause if (or during the period that) they have no definitive answer
to the empirical question about the magnitude of perverse effects.
One natural starting point leads down a blind alley. This is the observation that striking down statutes is likely to reduce the total volume of
federal law because political inertia-the costs of legislating produced by
bicameralism, presentment, and so on-make it difficult for Congress to
respond by re-enacting a broader or bundled statute to save a statute that
has recently been invalidated. It's not so clear that the conventional image of the inertia-ridden Congress is sensible, but the real flaw in the observation is analytical. It's true that when narrow statutes like the GunFree School Zones Act are invalidated, inertia may prevent Congress from
enacting a correcting statute. The contrary effect, however, is that legislative coalitions, anticipating judicial behavior, may broaden the scope of
statutes when they are first enacted, packaging suspect provisions with unimpeachable provisions in order to ensure that the suspect provisions are
held constitutional. The volume of federal lawmaking is a function not
only of the number of extant statutes, but also of their scope. The perverse effect of intermediate intensities of review is to reduce the number
of statutes while broadening the scope of new enactments. The latter effect may dominate the former.
There is also a more subtle argument: courts should not worry about
the perverse effect of current doctrine because the harms of the perverse
effect, if any, have already been felt. The aggregation doctrine has been
around at least since Wickard; the comprehensive-scheme principle has
roots in the Shreveport Rate Cases from 1914, and it flowers no later than
1981, when the Court decided Hodel. Perhaps Congress has already broadened and bundled its enactments to account for these doctrines. If, on
the other hand, Congress is not sensitive to Commerce Clause doctrine,
then the Court's recent decision to initiate more aggressive Commerce
Clause review can't make things worse (from the decentralizers'
standpoint).
But this point fails to distinguish two possible roles that doctrines
such as the aggregation and comprehensive-scheme principles might play:
(1) as safe harbors for congressional exercise of the commerce power; or
(2) as restrictions on the exercise of that power. In Wickard and the other
cases, the effect of emphasizing aggregation or comprehensiveness was to
make safely constitutional a law that pressed the limits of contemporane-
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ous Commerce Clause doctrine. 58 After that sort of opinion, it's quite
easy to imagine congressional coalitions drawing the lesson that such doctrines are safe harbors but not restrictions; the Court would invoke them
to sustain legislation that regulated intrastate activities, but would not
point to their absence to invalidate intrastate legislation. In that case
there would be no incentive to broaden or bundle enactments. The incentive arises only if the doctrines cut both ways, so that meeting their
conditions validates an intrastate regulation, while failing their conditions
makes the regulation invalid.
This view explains the seeming puzzle that Lopez has been the most
dramatic Commerce Clause decision in decades even though it effected
little surface change in Commerce Clause doctrine. The answer to the
puzzle is that before Lopez, the nominal limits on the commerce power
weren't enforced; legislators had every reason to believe that the Court's
repeated warnings about limits on the commerce power were cheap talk,
and that any new statute regulating intrastate activity would be upheld on
some ground or other. That answer, however, exacerbates our uncertainty
about the possibility of perverse effects in the future. In the prior period,
legislators might have thought that any intrastate regulation could be enacted under the commerce power, but in important instances-such as
the Gun-Free School Zones Act-they chose to enact regulations of very
confined scope. Lopez and Morrison now give legislators reason to believe
that the aggregation and comprehensive-scheme principles serve as restrictions, and thus create the incentive to bundle and broaden provisions
into larger and more centralized packages. That incentive will operate, to
some degree, in the short and medium-term; but it is still far too early to
tell how strong the perverse effect will be.
So what should the judges do in the face of this uncertainty? The
judge who favors centralization shouldn't worry too much about the revival of Commerce Clause review; in this arena the decentralizers may just
be spiking the ball in their own end zone. True, the centralizing judge
who is certain that the perverse effect will hold, and that no other judge
knows this, might slyly vote for expanded Commerce Clause review, but in
the face of uncertainty that strategy is too clever by half; better for the
centralizing judge to turn to other, more pressing battles.
The harder question is what the judge who favors decentralization
should do. The sensible answer, it seems to me, is to shift to other means
of promoting decentralization. 59 The possibility of perverse effects could
58. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942).
59. I agree with much of Ernie Young's thoughtful discussion of the perversity
critique. See Ernest A. Young, Two Cheersfor Process Federalism,46 VILL. L. REV. 1349
(2001). But I disagree that the critical question is whether Commerce Clause review is "in fact more likely" to produce centralizing effects or decentralizing effects. Id. at 1394. This misapprehends the effect that the risk of perverse results
has on the ex ante decision that faces the decentralizing judge. Ex ante, the decentralizing judge may invest in a variety of instruments for promoting decentralization, including attempts to increase the stringency of Commerce Clause review,
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probably be avoided by moving to extremely aggressive Commerce Clause
review, but that is politically infeasible. Given that the only real choicebetween moderate review that might be perverse and no review at all-is
afflicted by severe uncertainty, the tiebreaker ought to be the consideration that if decentralization is the aim, it can be pursued more efficiently
by other means.
One option for decentralizers would be further development of the
commandeering case law or the state sovereign-immunity case law. I mentioned at the outset that the story about perverse effects seems much
cleaner and easier to tell for the commerce power than for the other areas
of the Court's recent federalism jurisprudence. There should thus be little
fear that these substitutes will prove equally perverse. True, in those areas
the decentralizer gets less bang for the buck, because rules that prohibit
commandeering and invasions of state sovereign immunity merely preclude certain means of enforcing federal policies; they do not preclude
the policy altogether. But if Commerce Clause review really does pose a
risk of perverse effects, then these substitute doctrines, however feeble,
cannot help but appear relatively more attractive, from the decentralizer's
point of view.

but also including activities such as commandeering review, Eleventh Amendment
scrutiny, lobbying Congress in opposition to new federal laws, donating to statesrights organizations, and so on. The risk that Commerce Clause review will increase centralization reduces the expected value of that instrument, relative to the

alternatives, and that reduction in expected value should in turn cause a shift to
other instruments at the margin. Because this effect takes place at the margin, it is
irrelevant whether the perverse (centralizing) effect is more probable than not.

The less likely the perverse effect the less the reduction in expected value, but in
any case Commerce Clause review becomes less attractive to the decentralizer than
it would be if perverse effects were certain not to occur.
Professor Young is correct that this account assumes limited judicial resources,
including political capital, an assumption that Professor Young appears to share.
See id. at 1393, n.196. But it is irrelevant, on the other hand, whether or not "the

perverse effects engendered by other forms of substantive review may be substantially worse than the risks posed by Commerce Clause review." Id. Again, the possibility of perverse effects reduces the expected value (to the decentralizer) of

Commerce Clause review, which in turn should promote a shift to those other
instruments at the margin, however attractive or unattractive the alternatives
would otherwise be. The upshot is that the magnitude of the perverse effect is
unclear, both to Professor Young and myself, but that the uncertainty should nonetheless cause rational decentralizers to shift away from Commerce Clause review
and towards other tactics.
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